Multiagent decision-making problems in partially observable environments are usually modeled as either extensive-form games (EFGs) within the game theory community or partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) within the reinforcement learning community. While most practical problems can be modeled in both formalisms, the communities using these models are mostly distinct with little sharing of ideas or advances. The last decade has seen dramatic progress in algorithms for EFGs, mainly driven by the challenge problem of poker. We have seen computational techniques achieving super-human performance, some variants of poker are essentially solved, and there are now sound local search algorithms which were previously thought impossible. While the advances have garnered attention, the fundamental advances are not yet understood outside the EFG community. This can be largely explained by the starkly different formalisms between the game theory and reinforcement learning communities and, further, by the unsuitability of the original EFG formalism to make the ideas simple and clear. This paper aims to address these hindrances, by advocating a new unifying formalism, a variant of POSGs, which we call Factored-Observation Games (FOGs). We prove that any timeable perfect-recall EFG can be efficiently modeled as a FOG as well as relating FOGs to other existing formalisms. Additionally, a FOG explicitly identifies the public and private components of observations, which is fundamental to the recent EFG breakthroughs. We conclude by presenting the two building-blocks of these breakthroughs -counterfactual regret minimization and public state decomposition -in the new formalism, illustrating our goal of a simpler path for sharing recent advances between game theory and reinforcement learning community.
Introduction
Sequential decision-making problems are one of the core topics of artificial intelligence research. The ability of an artificial agent to perform actions, observe their consequences, and then perform further actions to achieve a goal is instrumental to everything from robotics and autonomous driving to medical decision diagnosis and automated personal assistants. Recent progress has led to unprecedented results in many large-scale problems of this type. While conceptually simpler problems can be modeled with perfect information or by regarding the other agents as stationary parts of the environment, realistic models of real-world situations require rigorous treatment of imperfect information and multiple independent decision-makers operating in a shared environment. outperform human professionals in no-limit Texas hold'em poker (Moravčík et al., 2017; Brown and Sandholm, 2017) .
This idea of decomposition can be extended to other games and the requirement for public observations can be weakened to common knowledge (Šustr et al., 2019) : the information which all players know and all players know that all players know it, etc. However, the formalism of extensive-form games explicitly models only the information available to the acting player, and it is not possible to consistently define the other players' information without knowing more about the problem than just its EFG model. Without additional knowledge about the task, it is therefore impossible to consistently model the common knowledge and difficult to formally analyze decomposition in imperfect information games. This suggests that maybe a new formal model is needed to make further advances smoother and easier to communicate.
We have found that switching to FOGs, a slightly extended model of POSGs, makes reasoning about decomposition much simpler, allows modeling almost all 3 games with a model of a similar size 4 , and allows better exposition and cross-fertilization of algorithmic ideas with the very active communities of reinforcement learning and Dec-POMDP planning. Transferring results from POSGs to FOGs is straightforward since we can ignore the factorization of observations. This paper creates the necessary formal basis for transferring results form EFGs to FOGs. It proves that any timeable perfect-recall EFG is equivalent to a POSG (and hence FOG) and shows the trade-offs in translating one model to the other. It explains the difficulties with modeling the opponents' information in EFGs, complications with modeling common knowledge in general, and formally analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of using FOGs with explicit labeling of public knowledge. It demonstrates the transfer of results from EFGs to FOGs by formalizing two key components of DeepStack (Moravčík et al., 2017) and Libratus (Brown and Sandholm, 2017) : Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and decomposition of a game into subgames.
Factored-Observation Game
We now describe the proposed model as a special case of a POSG. A Factored-Observation Game (FOG) is a tuple G = N , W, w o , A, T , R, O s.t.:
• N = {1, . . . , N } is the player set.
• W is the set of world states and w 0 ∈ W is a designated initial state.
• A = A 1 × · · · × A N is the space of joint actions.
-The subsets A i (w) ⊂ A i and A(w) = A 1 (w) × · · · × A N (w) ⊂ A specify the (joint) actions legal at w ∈ W. -For a ∈ A, we write a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ).
-A i (w) for i ∈ N are either all non-empty or all empty. A world state with no legal actions is terminal.
• After taking a (legal) joint action a at w, the transition function T determines the next world state w , drawn from the probability distribution T (w, a) ∈ ∆(W).
• We write R = (R 1 , . . . , R N ), where R i (w, a) is the reward i receives when a joint action a is taken at w.
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• O = (O priv(1) , . . . , O priv(N ) , O pub ) is the observation function, where O (·) : W × A × W → O (·) specifies the private observation that i receives, resp. the public observation that everybody receives, upon transitioning from world state w to w via some a.
-For each i, we write O i (w, a, w ) = O priv(i) (w, a, w ), O pub (w, a, w ) ∈ O i := O priv(i) × O pub , where O (.) denote the sets of possible observations. Since FOG doesn't explicitly send agents rewards and legal actions, this setting assumes the agents have access to the full model of G. This goes naturally with the view that each agent implicitly assigns some value to each world-state, and the rewards reflect the immediate changes in this value. In particular, it is entirely possible for the agent to be uncertain about their reward.
We contrast this view with the alternative where rewards are a signal coming from the outside world. While this isn't a canonical part of FOGs, models of many domains will in fact have observations 3 all timeable perfect-recall games 4 quadratic in the worst case 5 As is common in MDPs, we could equivalently consider rewards that depend on (w, a, w ), or just on w .
with separate side-channels for rewards and legal actions, and thus be of this second type. Such a model is useful for describing and analyzing model-free learning agents, who don't have direct access to the full model of the problem.
Derived objects and the optimization criterion
From G, we derive the trees of histories and the cumulative rewards, which are similar to the objects used in the EFG literature. Therefore, they allow reasoning about FOGs and proving their properties by methods commonly used for EFGs.
• A legal history (or trajectory) is a finite sequence h = (w 0 , a 0 , w 1 , a 1 , . . . , w t ), where w k ∈ W, a k ∈ A(w k ), and w k+1 ∈ W is in the support 6 of T (w k , a k ). We denote the set of all legal histories by H.
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-Since the last state in each h ∈ H is uniquely defined, the notation for W can be overloaded to work with H (e.g., A(h) := A(the last w in h), h being terminal, ...). -We use g h to denote the fact that g is a prefix of h, and g h to denote g is a prefix of h or equal to h.
When h is a terminal history, cumulative rewards can also be called utilities.
The observations in G induce the corresponding information-set trees. We use these to define the notion of a strategy, which turns G into a well-defined problem: the goal of each player is to choose a policy in a way that maximizes their expected cumulative reward.
• Player i's action-observation history at h = (w 0 , a 0 , w 1 , a 1 , . . . , w t ) is the sequence
The space S i of all such sequences can be viewed as the information state space of i.
-We assume that i's information states determine which i's actions are legal:
• A policy profile is a tuple π = (π 1 , . . . , π N ), where each policy (also called a strategy)
) specifies the probability distribution from which i draws their next action (conditional on having information s i ).
Finally, the factorization of each observation into the private and public parts allows us to define the tree of public states:
• 
-The space S pub of all public states is called the public tree.
Connections to Existing Models
We now describe the correspondence between EFGs, models used in RL, and FOGs.
Extensive Form Games
Extensive form games are a framework for analyzing sequential decision making, which assumes that only one player acts in each decision point of the game. Simultaneous moves can be represented by hiding opponents' move choices. EFGs are assumed to be finite, and the rewards (typically called utilities) are only awarded at terminal states. In this section, we show a relationship between timeable EFGs with perfect recall and finite-horizon FOGs. We now recall the definitions of the EFG model, 6 For finite W, being in support of some probability measure µ ∈ ∆(W ) is equivalent to having a non-zero probability under µ.
7 To simplify the discussion, we assume that H is finite. This can always be enforced by using finite horizon T , but some domains satisfy this assumption naturally. Moreover, our results generalize into the standard γ-discounted rewards setting. 8 We assume that the start of the game gets announced by some Oi(−, −, w 0 ). This is important for model-free agents, who might need to receive some observation to know which actions are available to them. timeability and perfect recall and formulate the main results, while more details and proofs can be found in Appendix C.
Based on (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) , an EFG is a tuple F = (H, Z, A, N , P, σ c , u, I), where
• H is the set of histories, representing sequences of actions.
• Z is the set of terminal histories (those z ∈ H which are not a prefix of any other history).
• For a non-terminal history h ∈ H \ Z, A(h) := {a | ha ∈ H} is the set of actions available at h. • N = {1, . . . , N } is the player set, where c is a special player, called "chance" or "nature".
• P : H \ Z → N ∪ {c} is the player function partitioning non-terminal histories into H i , i = 1, . . . , N, c depending on which player acts at h.
• The strategy of chance is a fixed probability distribution σ c over actions in H c .
• The utility function u = (u i ) i∈N assigns to each terminal history z a reward u i (z) ∈ R received by each player upon reaching z.
• The information-partition I = (I i ) i∈N captures the imperfect information of G. For each player, I i is a partition of H i . If g, h ∈ H i belong to the same I ∈ I i then i cannot distinguish between them. For each I ∈ I i , the available actions A(h) are the same for each h ∈ I, and we overload A(·) as A(I) := A(h).
A behavioral strategy σ i ∈ Σ i of player i assigns to each I ∈ I i a probability distribution σ i (I) over available actions a ∈ A(I). A tuple σ = (σ i ) i∈N ∈ Σ is called a strategy profile. When solving an EFG, the goal is typically to find a strategy profile σ * , called Nash equilibrium, where no player can increase their expected utility by deviating from σ * .
Timeability: A transition in E is any triplet (h, a, ha), where h ∈ H, a ∈ A(h). A transitiontiming in E is any mapping τ that assigns to each triplet its duration τ (h, a, ha)
. Inspired by (Jakobsen et al., 2016b) , we say that E is τ -timeable if every two histories from the same information set have the same timing ϕ τ (·).
In FOGs, we define timeability analogously, requiring that for any histories g, h, ϕ τ (g) = ϕ τ (h) holds whenever s i (g) = s i (h) for some agent i. Figure 1 : In this two-player EFG, the dotted nodes do not exist, and transitioning from h n to g n by going left takes N − n units of time. After adding the dotted nodes, each transition takes exactly 1 unit of time. However, this increases the size of the game from linear to quadratic in N .
Perfect recall: Informally, an agent has perfect recall if they don't forget information they had in the past (Kuhn, 1953) . In EFGs, this can be formalized by defining the notion of infoset-action history of player i (AIH i ), and requiring that for each i's infoset I, all histories within I have the same AIH i . In contrast, FOGs have perfect recall by definition -this is trivial since the players' strategies are defined over their observation-action histories.
Strategic equivalence: Intuitively, we think of two games as strategically equivalent if solving one gives a recipe for solving the other, and vice versa. Since properly formalizing this notion would be outside of the scope of this text, we use a weaker version of equivalence. In the remainder of this section, we denote the objects coming from a specific game by putting the game into the object's upper index. Let E and G be two N -player games (EFG, POSG, or other, not necessarily both of the same type) with policy/strategy spaces Σ 
(However, our proof of Theorem 3.1 actually gives a stronger equivalence between E and G by embedding E into G and showing that this suffices for the strategic equivalence defined above.) (Oliehoek et al., 2006) studying the transformation of POSGs to EFGs. The idea behind (i) is using the following lemma to make the EFG 1-timeable and show that the strategic equivalence is preserved in a FOG obtained by copying the structure of the EFG, adding dummy actions for non-acting players, and observing newly entered information sets. This also yields an exact formula for the size of W G from (i). Lemma 3.2 (Reformulation of Lemma C.8). Every τ -timeable EFG E, for integer-valued τ , is strategically equivalent to 1-timeable EFG E with |H E | = |H E | + ha τ (h, a, ha). Figure 1 shows a game where Lemma C.8 leads to a quadratic increase in size.
POSGs and Models for Reinforcement Learning
There are many formalizations and variants of POSGs in the literature (Peshkin et al., 2000; Hansen et al., 2004b; Emery-Montemerlo et al., 2004; Horak and Bosansky, 2019) . However, they all share the underlying idea of multiple agents acting simultaneously, receiving some reward, anddepending on the chosen joint action -stochastically transitioning to a different state that they only view through partial observations. The model we propose isn't novel; rather it is strongly inspired by formalisms such as (Hansen et al., 2004b; Emery-Montemerlo et al., 2004) . Except for using a different letter to denote the underlying (world-)state-space, the two main differences are that each observation O(w, a, w ) is determined by the transition (w, a, w ), rather than depending on it stochastically, and that each observation is factored into the private and public part. This explicit labeling of some information as public has been inspired by poker but also appears in the POSG literature (Foerster et al., 2018; Horak and Bosansky, 2019) . In particular, the Factored-Observation Game model is a special case of the POSG model, and any algorithm that can be applied to POSGs also works for FOGs. However, we believe the algorithmic benefits of public states are so important that one should distinguish between this model and a general POSG, which is why we give the formalism a distinct name.
While FOGs are a special case of POSGs, the assumptions made by FOGs don't restrict their generality. Indeed, one can model a general POSG within FOGs by adding a hidden variable to the world-state (which emulates stochastic observations) and moving the public part of every observation into the private ones. Regarding the connections to the models used in RL, FOG therefore inherits all the properties of POSGs. Among single-agent problems, fully-observable FOGs coincide with MDPs and the general case coincides with POMDPs. It isn't surprising that fully-observable multiagent FOGs coincide with stochastic games, while the general case yields POSGs. However, we also get Dec-POMDPs, which are formally a special case of POSGs. Dec-POMDPs are a framework for studying decentralized cooperation problems, and they have received a large amount of attention since 2000.
Sub-game Decomposition
In this section, we explore the connections between the objective, subjective, and public points of view. We also show how public states can be used to decompose FOGs into smaller independent problems.
Recall that H denotes the set of histories, S i the set of information states, and S pub the set of public states. When the FOG model is known, a history h conveys more information than the corresponding information state s i ∈ S i , which in turns conveys more information than the corresponding public state. In this sense, the mappings s i : H → S i , s pub : S i → S pub and s pub : H → S pub can be viewed as projections, and we have "s Figure 7 for illustration). We use the following notation to talk about all histories that correspond to the same information state or public state:
corresponding to s i . For s ∈ S pub , I pub (s) := {h ∈ H | s pub (h) = s} denotes the public set corresponding to s. By I i := {I i (s i ) | s i ∈ S i } and I pub := {I pub (s) | s ∈ S pub } we denote the information partition of i, resp. the public partition.
Since the mappings I i : S i → I i and I pub : S pub → I pub are bijections, we use I i → s i (I i ) and I pub → s pub (I pub ) to denote the corresponding inverse mappings. Since it is possible to compose many of these mappings together, we overload this notation using the "target_object_type(starting_object)" convention -for example, we set I i (h) := I i (s i (h)) and I pub (I i ) := (I pub • s pub • s i )(I i ) = the (uniquely defined) public set which contains the given information set I i . When there is no danger of confusion, we drop the subscript i from I i .
Similarly, we can identify each public state s ∈ S pub with the corresponding collection S i (s) := {s i ∈ S i | s pub (s i ) = s} of information states or information sets I i (s) := {I ∈ I i | s pub (I) = s}. Definition 4.2 (Subgame). Let G be an FOG. A subgame rooted at a public state s ∈ S pub is the set
While most of the ideas related to decomposition in games with imperfect information have been developed in the EFG framework (augmented information sets, public states, and subgames, defined in (Burch et al., 2014; Johanson et al., 2011; Moravčík et al., 2017; Šustr et al., 2019) ), this has been done in a patchwork-manner -indeed, for example the observation that public states are the roots of subgames has only been written down recently (Šustr et al., 2019) , even though the connection should be an obvious one. Moreover, these recent definitions did not succeed at capturing the intuitive notions of private and public information, because the augmented information sets of (Burch et al., 2014) delay the non-acting player's information until the last possible moment: Claim 4.3. The augmented information sets defined in the literature are unintuitive, unsuited for online play, and produce unnecessarily large subgames. For an example and further details which prove this claim, as well as the proofs of the remaining results, see Appendix E or (Kovarik and Lisy, 2019) . In light of this negative result, it is natural to try and come up with a definition which would avoid these shortcomings. However, this is impossible to do, since the EFG model doesn't contain enough information to derive the information of the non-active player. Indeed, one can find two real-world tasks with different structure of information, which however naturally correspond to the same EFG model: Claim 4.4. In general, it is impossible to derive the "correct" augmented information sets from the EFG model.
Of course, one might try some promising approach anyway; a good example would be to "learn everything as soon as possible", which corresponds to defining I aug i as "the finest partition of H that is consistent with I i ". Unfortunately, this fails because of the following negative result which shows that it is impossible to find a general formula for "the most informative I aug i ": Lemma 4.5. For some games, there is no single finest partition of H consistent with I i .
Proof. The game in Figure 2 illustrates that there doesn't always exist a unique solution to the problem of finding information partitions that cannot be refined any further while remaining consistent with I i . It shows that sometimes a choice has to be made about which information to reveal early.
Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2007) is an algorithm for approximately solving two-player, zero-sum games by finding an approximation of a Nash equilibrium. It fits into the general category of a policy improvement algorithm, and can be compactly described as self-play with independent instances of the regret-matching algorithm (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000) operating over the actions at each information state for each player, using a particular notion of expected reward for the actions, the counterfactual value.
Counterfactual values for player i are defined in terms of a probability P π −i of i's opponents and the transition function generating the history 9 . That is,
where P T (h) and P π j (h) are the contributions of chance and player j, respectively, to the probability of generating h
We now define the state value v π i (h ) as the expected future reward under policy π to player i conditional on the environment having generated the given history. The action value q π i (h, a i ) is defined analogously, except that i first takes the action a i :
The counterfactual-weighted action value for player i of action a ∈ A i at state s ∈ S i is
Having these counterfactual-weighted action values, we define the corresponding counterfactual weighted state values as
Note that counterfactual values are not conditional on reaching the state, as is standard in reinforcement learning, but instead depend, in a particular way, on the probability of reaching the state.
Given a strategy sequence π 0 , . . . , π t−1 , the accumulated regret at time t for an action a at state s is
Denoting (x) + := max(x, 0), the policy at time t is defined by the regret-matching algorithm:
In the original context of two-player, zero-sum, perfect recall EFGs, Zinkevich et al. (2007) show that the profile of average policies
-approximation to a Nash equilibrium. While we cannot use the equivalence between EFG and FOG from Theorem 3.1 to apply the CFR result to FOG, we can follow the steps of the proof for any finite, two-player, zero-sum FOG, noting that all FOGs have perfect recall. Applying regret-matching to counterfactual values at every state (action-observation history) will still minimize counterfactual regret, and we maintain the same recursive structure where counterfactual value of an action can be expressed in terms of the expected counterfactual values of the descendants. Finally, the folk theorem linking regret to the distance from NE is a consequence of strategic equivalence constructed in Theorem 3.1.
Conclusion
In light of the recent breakthroughs in large variants of poker, one would hope to take the algorithmic ideas that allowed these advances, and bring them to the attention of the multiagent learning community, to the expected benefit of research in both areas. Unfortunately, this effort has been hindered by the very formalism that carried the poker research through more than 60 years -EFGs. As we show in Section 4 and Appendix E, the EFG model is not suitable for decomposition, which is a key concept behind the recent poker milestones.
We thus introduced a variant of a POSG, called FOG, to serve as the bridging formalism between the two communities. FOGs are general enough to represent any POSG, and Theorem 3.1 shows that any reasonable EFG can be modeled as a FOG. Furthermore, we provide an extensive discussion on the design choices of the proposed model (Appendix B) and discuss connections and mapping to existing models in more detail (Appendix C). To visualize the introduced formalism and contrast it to EFGs, Appendix F contains a graphical comparison of EFGs and FOGs on a small poker example.
To illustrate that FOGs can indeed be used to bring over the recent insights to the multiagent RL side of solving partially-observable multiagent problems, Section 4 and Appendix D show that decomposition is straightforward in FOGs and has intuitive properties, Section 5 presents the CFR algorithm within FOGs, and Appendix A shows the FOG variant of the sequence form. 
A FOG Sequence Form
Sequence-form representation is a prominent method in EFGs, as it allows for effective solving of two-player zero-sum EFGs by linear programming (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008; Nisan et al., 2007) . In this section, we describe a sequence-form representation of a FOG. We keep the structure and notation close to the the sequence form representation of EFGs as presented in (Nisan et al., 2007) .
Recall that the letter Z is used to denote the set of all terminal trajectories. For z ∈ Z, u i (z) denotes the corresponding utility of i, that is, the reward accumulated on trajectory z:
We use B i := {sa | s ∈ S i , a ∈ A i (s)} to denote the set of all action-observation sequences of a player i that end in an action and set b i (ha) := s i (h)a. For a fixed policy π, the sequence form realization probability of a sequence sa ∈ B i is s a sa π i (s , a ). In a two-player FOG, we use x and y to denote the vectors of these quantities for all such sequences of player 1 and 2 respectively. The sequence-form payoff matrix A ∈ R B1×B2 of the first player consists of entries A στ for σ ∈ B 1 , τ ∈ B 2 where
Using this notation, the expected utility under π can be rewritten in terms of realization plans as
Analogously to (Nisan et al., 2007, Proposition 3.10) , one can show that a vector x = (x sa ) sa∈Bi is a realization plan corresponding to some policy π if and only if it is non-negative and satisfies the following two properties:
Reorganizing (A.4) and (A.5), we can be compactly express these equations using sparse ±1-valued matrices E, F and vectors e, f (Nisan et al., 2007, Section 3.10):
(A.7) Similarly to (Nisan et al., 2007, Theorem 3.13) , an approximate NE of a two-player perfectinformation zero-sum FOG can by computed by the LP minimize u,y e T u, subject to F y = f, E T u − Ay ≥ 0, y ≥ 0.
(A.8)
B Generalizations and Design Choices behind FOGs
In this section, we list some of the useful generalizations and special cases of the FOG model and discuss the design choices behind the definition of the FOG model.
B.1 Generalizations of the FOG model
• Observations shared between a subset of players: As a straightforward generalization of the FOG model, we can assume that the observation function is of the form O = (O P ) P ⊂N and each player receives the observation O i = (O P ) i∈P ⊂N . This is useful for modelling games such as Hanabi or ≥ 3-player strategic computer games.
• Observation consisting of features: Additionally, we can assume that each O P (w, a, w )
consists of pairs o = (f, x) =: (o(f ), o(x)) (called elementary observations), where f : W × A × W → X f is some feature in G (typically X f = R) and x = f (w, a, w ) is E's value. Some example features are: Which figure stands at B3 (in chess)? Which two private cards am I holding (in poker)? Whose turn is it (in chess)? Which state are we at (i.e. the identity on W)? How much reward did I just get?
• Chance player: There is an extra player c, called chance or nature. Chance has its actions A c and observations O c , but its strategy π c is fixed (and hence there is no need to define its rewards).
• Instead of all players taking an action at each state, a player function P : w ∈ W → P(w) ⊂ {1, . . . , N } determines the set of players that act. We have A i (w) = ∅ ⇐⇒ i / ∈ P(w). The player might still receive observations when inactive, but they do not write down any action. We assume that each player can deduce from I i (h) whether he acts at h or not.
• Stochastic observations: Rather than being a deterministic function of the transition (w, a, w ), we might have O(w, a, w ) ∈ ∆(O). This is an important assumption for example in robotics.
B.2 Discussion of the Design Choices behind the FOG model
Explicitly labeling some information as public: To see why this is useful, let us first describe the difference between common knowledge (among the active agents) and what we call "public knowledge". A piece of information is common knowledge if everybody knows it, everybody knows that everybody knows it, and so on. Public knowledge can be viewed as a stronger version of this notion, where the fact that a piece of information is common knowledge is explicitly labeled with the information. Examples of public knowledge are real-world group conversations or CC'ed emails. Conversely, if a conversation with a friend reveals that we have both seen the same movie, the contents of the movie become a common, but not public, knowledge among us (however this requires some steps of inference as opposed to having seen the movie together). While it is unclear how to define common-knowledge states, common-knowledge sets I ck can be formally defined as the smallest possible subsets of H closed under the membership within I i for all i. Remark B.1. Checking for identical public information is much cheaper than checking for identical common-knowledge.
In principle, we could always assume that all observations are private, and only consider I ck . However, this would only work for model-based agents, and even then, verifying whether two histories belong to the same I ck can be very costly. Indeed, sometimes the easiest way to check whether I ck (g) = I ck (h) might be to start with the set {g} and keep adding histories which belong to the same information set for one of the players until the procedure terminates. This builds up the whole common-knowledge state, and we check whether h belongs to it. Even assuming that iterating over the elements of a given information set isn't expensive, we might have to do this roughly |I ck |-times. One only needs to contrast this with public states, where verifying whether s pub (g) = s pub (h) has the complexity Ω(len(g)) (it suffices to go through the sequences of transitions that make up g and h, and see whether they generate the same sequence of public observations).
On the other hand, many domains naturally contain public observations: In board games and card games, essentially everything (except for cards that are viewed secretly) is observed publicly. In 2-player StarCraft, hostile units (with the same view range) that see each other do it "publicly". In Kriegspiel (blind chess), the fact that a player took an action, or when one of the figures gets captured, this fact always get observed by both players. Ultimately, common-knowledge sets generate finer partitions and smaller subgames that are easier to solve, but the required computational and mental overhead lead us to prefer public states as the canonical choice for handling decomposition.
No player function: When defining the model, one faces the choice between letting all players act at every state and having a player function that decides who is active. Since all active players remember submitting an action, they all "see the time passing". It follows that unless the game is 1-timeable (i.e., timeable with transitions that last exactly 1 unit of time), making all players active will create a game that is not strategically equivalent (Appendix C). This has two consequences: firstly, the FOG formalism cannot represent non-timeable games. Since these games are quite pathological and not of particular interest (Jakobsen et al., 2016a) , we view this as good news. Second, timeable games first have to be "padded" to become 1-timeable (Lemma C.8), which increases their size. Luckily, card and board games and most other games are naturally 1-timeable, so this doesn't become an issue in practice. The main drawback of this choice thus becomes the fact that having a player function would be more natural in turn-based games such as chess.
Rewards are non-observable by default: Formally, this assumption comes at no cost since rewards can always be added into observations (Appendix B). As mentioned in Section 2, non-observable rewards correspond to the intuition "rewards as changes in the value of world-state" while observable rewards are closer to the standard RL intuition of "rewards as pain/pleasure signals". Consequently, we believe the main cost lies in this discrepancy between the meaning of rewards in model-based and model-free approaches. However, this can also be viewed as a benefit since this discrepancy already exists and being explicit about it gets rid of some of the surrounding confusion. Moreover, this avoids some of the drawbacks of the observable rewards: namely, there are many situations where we wish to assign rewards to unobserved consequences, such as an attacker stealing data in network security games. While one can push the reward signal to a later time when the attack gets revealed, delaying the feedback slows down learning and causes complications for discounted rewards. Arguably, it might also incentivize agents to prevent negative rewards altogether by "hiding from bad news" or "wireheading" (Everitt and Hutter, 2016) .
Other choices:
• Observations describe changes in the world-state (rather than describing the world-state directly): Since strategy takes into account all observations, an observation O i (w, a, w ) only needs to describe the difference between w and w , rather than full w . This is arguably more intuitive in some games (e.g. chess) and reduces bandwidth and memory usage of the agents. Moreover, there are games where legal actions naturally depend on history (e.g. ko in Go).
• No chance player: In EFGs, randomness of the environment is represented by a chance player whose strategy is fixed. While the chance player is redundant with a stochastic transition function (Appendix C), our main reason for not considering chance is to make the model familiar to people used to the MDP setting. On the other hand, adding chance is necessary for direct backward compatibility with EFGs, and it is way more intuitive for modeling e.g. AI-controlled players in computer games.
• Only some actions are legal at each state: We keep this assumption since it seems crucial to achieving at least some compatibility with the EFG literature.
• Designated starting point w 0 : Some authors instead assume a prior distribution over W. This is formally equivalent since w 0 can be a dummy node that emulates this prior.
C Mapping and Connections to Existing Models: Details and Proofs
Correspondence between EFGs and FOGs: The goal of this section is to show that exactly timeable EFGs with perfect recall are strategically equivalent to finite-horizon FOG, and vice versa. We now define the related concepts, expand on the exact correspondence, and give its proof.
Intuitively, two games are strategically equivalent if solving one gives a recipe for solving the other, and vice versa. Since formalizing this notion would be outside of the scope of this text, we use a weaker version of equivalence: Let E and G be two N -player games (EFG, FOG, or others, not necessarily both of the same type) with strategy spaces
. We say that E and G are strategically equivalent if there is a mapping Φ = (
. In our proofs, we actually show a stronger equivalence that takes into account the structural properties of E and G.
Timeability: Informally, a game is timeable if each agent has access to a global clock. This notion comes from (Jakobsen et al., 2016b) , who formalize it for EFGs as follows: Definition C.1 ( (Jakobsen et al., 2016b) ). For an EFG E, deterministic timing is a mapping ψ : H E → [0, ∞) such that the label of any node is at least one higher than the label of its parent. A deterministic timing is exact if any two nodes in the same information set have the same label.
While it is debatable whether the intuition of timeability is better captured by "ψ(node) ≥ ψ(parent)+ 1" or "ψ(node) > ψ(parent)", the two are equivalent for finite domains.
Recall that to make the definition consistent with FOGs, our Section 3 we consistently generalized it as follows: A transition in E is any triplet (h, a, ha), where h ∈ H, a ∈ A(h). A transition-timing in E is any mapping τ that assigns to each triplet its duration τ (h, a, ha) ∈ [1, ∞). A timing corresponding to τ is ϕ τ :
RL EFG
FOG The actor in the task. i agent i player i agent, player The acting rule. π policy σ ∈ Σ strategy π / σ policy / strategy A measure of how long the task takes. T finite horizon D game depth T finite horizon The basic notion for describing the "state of the world". s ∈ S state h ∈ H history w ∈ W world state A list of everything that has happened so far, from the objective point of view. -trajectory h ∈ H history h ∈ H history Information based on which actors select their next actions. s b
state (MDP) belief (POMDP)
I ∈ I i information set s i ∈ S i action-observation sequence The immediate feedback on how well the actor is currently doing. r reward doesn't exist R i (s, a) reward The optimization criterion. cumulative reward u i utility cumulative reward The desirability of a given situation for an actor who uses a given acting rule. V π (s) value of s under π -expected utility at h v σ i (h) value of a history The cause of non-determinism in the task. T (s,a) transition prob.
σ c (h, a) chance strategy T (w, a) transition prob. The probability of ending up in a given situation. π σ (h) reach probability η π (h) reach probability Table 1 : A "dictionary" of the basic concepts of MDPs (and other models used in RL), EFGs, and FOGs. The correspondence is on the level of usage; for example, the correspondence between a state in an MDP and a history in an EFG doesn't mean that they are mathematically the same thing, but rather that the role states play in MDPs is analogous to the role histories play in EFGs.
In FOGs, we define timeability analogously, requiring that for any histories g, h, ϕ τ (g) = ϕ τ (h) holds whenever s i (g) = s i (h) for some agent i.
This allows us to formulate the following trivial, yet still note-worthy result: Proposition C.2 (Timeability of EFGs and FOGs).
(i) Not all EFGs are timeable.
(ii) Every FOG admits a timing under which all transitions take exactly 1 unit of time.
In particular, histories that correspond to the same information state have the same length.
Proof. For an example of a non-timeable domain, see (Jakobsen et al., 2016b) . To prove (ii), recall every player takes an action in each state, so they can always look at how many actions they have submitted so far, and thus infer the number of transitions that have occurred. This shows that constant ψ 1 is always an exact deterministic timing.
Example C.3. Making everybody act at each state can leak information. Suppose we are playing a "game" between a merchant caravan and bandits. The bandits decide between doing nothing and preparing an ambush in the forest, which takes 1 additional action (to find a hiding place). The merchants then decide to go through the forest or take the long way around. When modeling the game as a FOG (or a POSG), the merchants do not directly observe anything about the bandits. However, they do know how many of the "do nothing for 1 turn" actions they were asked to submit. They use this information to infer the bandits' strategy and never get ambushed as a result.
Perfect recall Informally, an agent has perfect recall if they always remember all the information they had in the past (Kuhn, 1953) . In EFGs, authors often define perfect recall informally as each player remembers his past actions and information sets. This can be formalized by defining the notion of infoset-action history of player i, and requiring that "for each i's infoset I, all histories within I have the same AIH i . In contrast, FOGs have perfect recall by definition -this is trivial since the players' strategies are defined over their observation-action histories. As with timeability, this implies that not all EFGs can be meaningfully represented as FOGs: Proof. A classic example of a (one player) EFG without perfect recall is the absent-minded driver problem. The second part is trivial, as noted above.
Having clarified the negative results, we are ready to get started with the proof of the correspondence between EFGs and FOGs:
Theorem 3.1 (Equivalence of timeable perfect-recall EFGs and finite-horizon POSGs).
(i) Any timeable EFG E with perfect recall is strategically equivalent to some finite-horizon POSG G (and hence FOG) for which
(ii) Every FOG has perfect recall and is 1-timeable, i.e. timeable where each transition takes exactly 1 unit of time. Some EFGs satisfy neither and therefore cannot be modeled as FOGs. (iii) Any FOG G with finite-horizon T is strategically equivalent to some timeable EFG E with perfect recall for which
The case (ii) follows from Propositions C.2 and C.4. We now prove (iii), and the remainder of the section presents the proof of (i). Figure 3 : In this two-player EFG, the dotted nodes do not exist, and transitioning from h n to g n by going left takes N − n units of time. By adding the dotted nodes, we modify the game s.t. each transition takes exactly 1 unit of time. However, this increases the size of the game from linear in N to quadratic in N .
Remark C.5 (Optimality of Theorem 3.1). Assuming a better definition of strategic equivalence, the bounds from Theorem 3.1 are likely optimal. For specific games, a tighter exact formula follows from Lemma C.8. In practice, the size of many domains will not increase by "FOG-ization" at all, but there are also non-artificial domains with up to D/2-fold increase, where D is the depth of the EFG. This happens in games which are typically short but have a small chance of containing long sequences of actions whose existence isn't known to the opponent. For example in the game of phantom tic-tac-toe, placing one's mark can be preceded by up to 4 attempted "illegal moves". To prevent information leaks, the FOG needs to be "padded" such that all indistinguishable nodes have the same length, which increases the size nearly four times. Since the quadratic bound in the first part of Theorem 3.1 is derived from Lemma C.8 (as the worst case), one can also use the lemma directly to obtain an exact formula for the size increase caused by our method. Figure 3 depicts a domain where the increase truly is of the quadratic order. Strictly speaking, Theorem 3.1 is not optimal, since our version of strategic equivalence doesn't take into account the structure of the games, and one could find a strategically equivalent matrix game. While this looseness could be fixed by finding a better formalization of strategic equivalence, the value of doing so currently doesn't seem very high. For more information on "EFG-ization" of POSGs, we refer the reader to (Oliehoek et al., 2006) .
E by unpacking simultaneous decisions of G into sequential ones, replacing stochastic transition probabilities by the chance player's actions, and pushing rewards into leaves:
• Histories: For every non-terminal h = (w 0 , . . . , w t ) ∈ H, H E \ Z E contains histories ha 1 . . . a i−1 , where i ∈ {1, . . . , N } ∪ {N + 1}, a i ∈ A i (w t ). Z E coincides with the set of all terminal histories in G.
• The player function is defined as P E (ha 1 . . . a i−1 ) := i for i = 1, . . . , N and P E (ha 1 . . . a N ) := c.
• I E i : A player i can't tell ha 1 . . . a i−1 apart from gb 1 . . . b i−1 in E iff they can't tell h apart from g in G.
• Actions and σ c : For non-chance nodes, the successors are defined in the obvious way.
For ha 1 . . . a N , the chance's actions are all the states w t+1 with σ c (ha 1 . . . a N , w t+1 ) := T (w t , (a 1 , . . . , a N ), w t+1 ) > 0, and taking w t+1 transitions the game into the history ha 1 . . . a N w t+1 .
• Utility: For terminal histories, we define u i (z) := G i (z).
This makes E a well-defined EFG. Moreover, the mappings Φ i : ha 1 . . . a i−1 → h induce a bijection between strategies in E and policies in G, and the expected utility of any strategy profile in E coincides with the expected cumulative reward of the corresponding policy profile in G (this is straightforward for pure strategies, and the general case follows).
Remark C.6. Making the "EFG-ization" less wasteful.
The EFG representation is typically less efficient than the FOG representation: firstly, the "sequentialization" of simultaneous decisions is wasteful. Second, when the state-space W of G is cyclic, the number of histories in G might be exponential in |W| and G's finite horizon T . Since the size of G's model is proportional to |W|, rather than |H|, this makes the FOG description much more compact. To make the EFG representation less wasteful, we can ignore players whose "decision" is a trivial one -in practice, this would mean only adding i's decision nodes if |A i (w t )| > 2, and only adding a chance node if the probability T (w t , a) isn't trivial (i.e. concentrated in a single point).
We now prepare the ground for proving the remaining part of the theorem. Lemma C.7. Any timeable EFG has a an exact deterministic timing with values in {0, . . . , |H| − 1}.
Proof. Let ψ : H E → [0, ∞) be an exact deterministic timing. We enumerate {t 0 , . . . , t N } := {ψ(h) | h ∈ H E } s.t. t n < t n+1 . We necessarily have N ≤ |H E | − 1. For h ∈ H E , we denote ϕ(h) := n for the integer n satisfying ψ(h) = t n . By definition of ϕ, we have ϕ(g) = ϕ(h) iff ψ(g) = ψ(h). Since ψ is a deterministic timing, we have h h =⇒ ϕ(h) ≤ ϕ(h ). It follows that ϕ is an exact deterministic timing that satisfies
For a fixed integer-valued timing ϕ in an EFG E and a history ha ∈ H E (where h ∈ H E , a ∈ A E (h)), we denote by τ ϕ (ha) := (ϕ(ha) − ϕ(h)) − 1 the number of "missing" time-stamps between ha and its parent. In this sense, the "length" of the transition from h to ha via a is 1 + τ ϕ (ha). Lemma C.8 (Padding an EFG with non-unit transitions). For any EFG E with exact deterministic integer-valued timing ϕ, there exists a strategically equivalent EFG E with transition length 1 and
Proof. Let E and ϕ be as in the lemma. For every h ∈ H E and a ∈ A E (h), we formally add to H E the nodes h, ha n for n = 1, . . . , τ ϕ (ha), and ha. (If h as already been added as h a for its parent h , we don't add it for the second time.) In E -histories of the form h and ha, both the acting player and available actions are as in E. The chance player acts in all the nodes of the form ha n , and he only has a single noop action. The transitions in E work as follows: h a ha 1 noop . . . noop ha n noop ha.
The remaining objects in E (player set, information partitions, utilities) are as in E.
The identity mappings h ∈ H E → h ∈ H E and a ∈ A E (h) → a ∈ A E (h) induce an isomorphism between strategies in E and E , which shows that E and E are strategically equivalent. Moreover, the deterministic timing ψ : h ∈ H E → the number of actions taken between the root of H E and h is exact in E . We conclude the proof by noting that the length of every transition in E is 1, and that H E has the desired size.
Together with Lemma C.7, this gives the following corollary: Corollary C.9 (The padding is quadratic). Any timeable EFG E admits a strategically equivalent timeable EFG E with transition length 1 and
Lemma C.10. Any perfect-recall EFG E that is timeable with transitions of length 1 is strategically equivalent to a finite-horizon FOG of the same size.
Proof. The basic ideas behind the construction are the following:
• The histories in E turn into states in G. The players who originally didn't act in h now do act, but they can only take a noop action "do nothing for 1 turn". The transitions in G work as in E.
• For non-terminal transitions, players receive no reward. A transition to a terminal state z gives R i (·, ·, z) := u i (z).
• In terminal states, players observe their utility. For h ∈ I ∈ I i where i acts, we have O i (·, ·, h) = I and O j (·, ·, h) := "not your turn" for j = i.
• Chance is transformed into stochastic transitions via T (h, (noop)
Moreover, for such H we have: (v) H is closed under descendants in H and membership within information sets.
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Proof. The "moreover" part follows from, e.g., (i), because closure under the membership within public states automatically implies closure under the membership within information sets. Indeed, if two histories belong to the same information set, they produce the same sequence of private and public observations (and actions), and hence they trivially also produce the same sequence of public observations, i.e., they belong to the same public state.
Denote by H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , and G(s) the sets from (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). The inclusion H 1 ⊃ H 2 is trivial. Note also that the second identity in (iv) always holds since g ∈ I pub (s ) ⇐⇒ s pub (g) = s .
To see that G(s) ⊃ H 1 , note that G(s) is a set containing h 0 and closed under both the membership within public states (by definition) and descendants in H (since h h 0 implies that s pub (h ) is an extension of s pub (h 0 )). This yields G(s) ⊃ H 1 .
The identity between H 3 and G(s) holds because for any s ∈ S pub we have The corollary of Proposition D.1 is that we can safely view (and search trough) subgames on the level of histories, information states, or public states, and all these views are equivalent. This result doesn't hold in EFGs since some of them might fail the implication (ii) =⇒ (i) (consider the EFG from Figure 4 with "public states = histories at the same level"). Moreover, even "well-behaved" EFGs have the drawback of not having a notion of "agent's information" outside of the agent's turn. This implies that in EFGs, the conditions (iii) and (iv) aren't defined at all. One can attempt to remedy this by considering augmented information sets (Burch et al., 2014) , but this approach sometimes doesn't work as one might intuitively expect (see Appendix E).
E Problems with Decomposition in EFGs: Details and Proofs
In the classical formulation of the EFG model, the imperfect information is introduced by specifying information sets which consist of histories between which the acting player cannot distinguish. In particular, the model doesn't specify which information is available for the non-acting players. This under-specification can be interpreted as a) the model only describing the active player or b) the players receiving no information outside of their turn.
In recent years, several works extended the EFG model by describing what the players know outside of their turn. This is helpful for search and decomposition, "resolving" sub-problems, and for online algorithms (updating on new information without waiting for the next turn). Formally, this was done by extending the information partitions I i over H i to "augmented" information partitions I aug i over H (Burch et al., 2014) , considering public states (sets closed under I aug i for every i, Johanson et al. 10 As shown in Appendix B.2, Ipub(h) isn't necessarily the smallest set containing h closed under the membership within information sets. (However, it is the smallest such set that a model-free agent can use.) As a result, H needs not be the smallest set satisfying (iv). The public states actually corresponding to these information partitions. There are only 5 public states along this history (rather than 12 as one might intuitively expect), and they do not even correspond to the rounds of the game. 2011) and subgames (subsets of H closed under descendants and public states Burch et al. 2014; Šustr et al. 2019 ).
As we illustrate below, this approach turned out to be problematic. We claim that instead of starting with information sets, it is more intuitive (and technically convenient) to derive information sets from observations. For further details regarding observations in EFGs and related counterexamples, see (Kovarik and Lisy, 2019) .
Example E.1. The augmented information sets defined in the literature are unintuitive, unsuited for online play, and produce unnecessarily large subgames.
Paraphrasing the original definition of (Burch et al., 2014) , two histories g, h ∈ H are in the same augmented information set of player i if they both generate the same sequence of information sets and actions.
11 This definition implies that the only information that a player learns between their two successive turns T 1 and T 2 is their own action taken at T 1, and all remaining information is delayed until T 2. If one wanted to play a perfect-information board game in this manner, all players would have to stay outside the room where the game takes place, and only come in when it's their turn (upon which a referee would tell them what happened since their last turn). This is an unsuitable design for three reasons: Firstly, our intuitive idea of how obtaining information works in games is very different, and we risk accidentally using properties of the "intuitive" augmented information sets when thinking about the properties of those defined by (Burch et al., 2014) .
12 Second, if used for online game playing where the time to make each decision is limited, these augmented information sets do not allow the agent to effectively use his opponent's turn to think (e.g. in poker, the second player wouldn't "see" the public card until their turn). Third, the public states defined as "sets of histories closed under membership within each I aug i " are very unintuitive and much larger than "what they should be" (Figure 5 ).
Based on the previous example, it might seem that the solution is to define augmented information sets as "the most informative partition of H that is still compatible with I i ", which would ensure that the players learn information as soon as possible. Unfortunately, there are games where this isn't a solution either -the reason for this is that the EFG model simply never contained the information required to correctly define augmented sets in the first place: Example E.2. In general, it is impossible to derive the "correct" augmented information sets from the EFG model.
Firstly, note that the "learn everything as soon as possible" approach isn't always suitable. Indeed, consider a "test-taking" scenario, where a teacher comes up with test questions (1 AM), gives the test to a student (9 AM), and the student submits their answers (9:15 AM). While the student eventually learns the outcome of the "come up with test questions" decision, letting him know before 9 AM would change the game substantially. (Even if we naively assume the extra thinking time would be the only advantage gained by the early announcement.) However, consider a hypothetical setting where the students have hacked into the teacher's computer, and turned on a script that automatically alerts them when a new file appears in the "Tests" folder. The students now have the same information as before, but they have 8 more hours to prepare. Since the EFG models describing these two scenarios are identical, it follows that when one has access to the EFG model, but not to the original problem description, it is impossible to deduce what the correct definition of augmented information sets.
In our view, the takeaway from these results is that the EFG model wasn't invented with online play or decomposition in mind, and it is therefore not reasonable to assume that it would be suited for working with these concepts. Instead, we propose to start with the perfect-information model, augment it by adding observations (directly as a part of the definition), and replace information sets (i.e. sets of indistinguishable histories) by action-observation sequences. Finally, even when working with information partitions, we have found it more fruitful to think of their elements as "sets of histories corresponding to a specific observation-action sequence" (if nothing else, it prevents us from considering pathological partitions that would never arise in practice). Since there POSG model already has these properties, it seems more reasonable to adopt it, rather than modifying the EFG model.
F Kuhn Poker Example
To get more intuition about the FOG model, we illustrate the way it views games on the example of Kuhn poker (Kuhn, 1950) . Figure 6 depicts the EFG model of this game. Note that the only granularity in this formalism is based on histories and information sets. On the other hand, a FOG allows for different granularity (the very reason one can decompose the games into sub-problems), and we visualize these different views in Figure 7 . 
